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CONCLUSION

INTRODUCTION

The nonobviousness requirement plays a critical role in United
States patent law. The requirement ensures that patents will be
granted for only significant advances over previously existing technology. Nonobviousness reflects "a careful balance between the need to
promote innovation and the recognition that imitation and refinement through imitation are both necessary to invention itself and the
very lifeblood of a competitive economy." 1 The patent system's health
is linked to a properly working nonobviousness doctrine.
Much of the current discussion regarding nonobviousness
focuses on the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,
the court with exclusive jurisdiction over patent appeals. 2 The court's
jurisprudence in this area, and in particular the court's application of
a particular part of the nonobviousness doctrine-the "suggestion
test," is the target of recent scrutiny. The court's case law is the center
of two recent reports, one by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
and the other by National Research Council (NRC). 3 It is also the
subject of a currently pending case before the Supreme Court, KSR
1

Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989).

28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) (2000).
3 See CoMM. ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RlcHTS IN THE KNoWLEDGE-BASED EcoN.,
NAT'L REsEARcH CouNCIL, A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21sT CENTURY (Stephen A. Merrill et al. eds., 2004); FED. TRADE CoMM'N, To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER
BALANcE oF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAw AND Pouc..Y (2003), available at http:/ I
www.ftc.gov I os/2003/1 0 /innovationrpt.pdf.
2
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International Co. v. Telejlex, Inc. 4 The general conclusion of the two
reports and the briefing in support of certiorari in KSR is that the
Federal Circuit has improperly relaxed the nonobviousness requirement. The court has made it easier to find a claimed invention
nonobvious and, as a result, obtain and enforce an invalid patent.
One of the alleged causes of this reduction in the nonobviousness
standard is the suggestion test employed by the court.
The problem with the recent reports and the current argumentation before the Supreme Court in KSR is that none of the assertions
being made are supported by recent empirical data. 5 The reports and
criticism are only based on the "feel" of the case law" or the facts of
the KSR case alone? There is a real need for an empirical study that
systemically looks at the broader question of whether the Federal
Circuit has lowered the nonobviousness requirement and the narrow
question of whether the suggestion test is the cause. Such a study
would provide valuable data to test the current assertions about the
Federal Circuit's case law and inform decisionmakers, such as the
Supreme Court, who are presently considering modifYing the nonobviousness doctrine.
4 Teleflex, Inc. v. KSR Int'l Co., 119 F. App'x 282 (Fed. Cir. 2005), cert. granted,
126 S. Ct. 2965 (2006).
5 The NRC's report explicitly notes that no empirical analysis of these claims has
been done. See NAT'L REsFARCH CoUNCIL, supra note 3, at 3 ("The claim that quality
has deteriorated in a broad and systematic way could be, but has not been, empirically
tested.").
There are studies, none yet published, that focus on this recent criticism and
come to an opposite conclusion. See generally Supplemental Brief for the Respondents
at 4-6, KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., No. 04-1350 (U.S. June 6, 2006), 2006 WL
1547496 (collecting recent cases where the Federal Circuit has found patents obvious
and used a broad suggestion test and, not surprisingly, coming to the opposite conclusion of most critics); Christopher A. Co tropia, Patent Law Viewed Through an t.videntiary
Lens: The "Suggestion 'Test" as a Rule of Evidence, 2006 BYU L. REv. (forthcoming) (focusing on the specific claim that the Federal Circuit employs a strictly narrow suggestion
test and concluding that the Federal Circuit employs an evidentiary rule to determine
the breadth of evidence allowed to prove a suggestion to combine); Lee Petherbridge
& R. Polk Wagner, The Federal Circuit and Patentability: An Empirical Assessment of the Law
of Obviousness, 85 TEx. L. REv. (forthcoming june 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=923309 (examining empirically the Federal Circuit's nonobviousness jurisprudence and finding that the court has not weakened the standards for obtaining
patents). Notably, these studies either collect different data than the study reported
in this Article or take different looks at the same type of data.
6 See FED. TRADE CoMM'N, supra note 3, ch. 4, at 12.
7 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at
12-15, KSR, No. 04-1350 (U.S. Aug. 22, 2006), 2006 WL 2453601 (noting that the
KSR case demonstrates the rigid application of the suggestion test and how it results
in an improper finding that the patent is obvious).
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This Article provides such an empirical study. The study examines all Federal Circuit cases over a four-year period considering the
nonobviousness of a patent claim. Appeals from both patent infringement cases before district courts and pending patent applications and
interferences before the United States Patent and Trademark Office
(USPTO) are investigated. The study looks at the data in two levels of
detail.
First, the study takes a "macro-level" look at the collected data,
focusing on only the outcome of each of the nonobviousness claims.
Whether the Federal Circuit found the patent claim nonobvious or
obvious is recorded. In addition, whether the Federal Circuit
affirmed, reversed, or vacated the lower tribunal's decision is considered. The purpose of this macro-level study is to test the broad claim
being made in recent criticism-that the Federal Circuit has lowered
the nonobviousness requirement.
Second, the study takes a "micro-level" look at the actual reasoning behind the court's findings on the nonobviousness issue. This
part of the study examines what prompted a finding of nonobvious,
seeing if it was a failure to meet the suggestion test or something else.
The micro-level study also focuses on the procedural posture of the
case below-whether it was a grant of summary judgment, a grant of a
motion for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL), a verdict from a
bench trial, or a verdict from a jury trial. The micro-level study
attempts to measure the impact of the suggestion test on the nonobviousness analysis.
Based on this study's findings, the Article concludes that recent
criticism is not supported by the last four years of Federal Circuit case
law. In appeals from patent infringement cases, the macro-level study
finds a distribution that slightly favors findings of nonobvious, with
36.27% of the patents being found nonobvious and 28.43% of the
patents being found obvious. 8 In appeals from the USPTO, the
macro-level study finds a high percentage of findings of obvious in
85.19% of the patents. These results suggest that the court has not
lowered the nonobviousness requirement and may be maintaining a
higher nonobviousness requirement in the case of the USPTO. But
this conclusion is greatly tempered by the fact that the cases studied
may all include litigants and patent applicants that have already taken
into account a lowered nonobviousness standard. Thus, any inference
into the strength of the nonobviousness requirement from this data is
weak at best. The results of the macro-level study, therefore, while
8 The remaining percentage of patents, 35.29%, were vacated by the court. See
infra Part lll.A.l.
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providing some insight, cannot provide a solid conclusion one way or
the other.
The micro-level study produced more usable results. The suggestion test causes a finding of nonobvious, or a vacation of a finding of
obvious, in 32.91% of the patents appealed from patent infringement
cases. The suggestion test causes similar findings in appeals from the
USPTO in 11.11% of patents appealed. These low percentages stand
in sharp contrast to claims that the suggestion test has caused the nonobviousness requirement to lower, particularly in the context of the
USPTO. Instead, the suggestion test plays a fairly small role in the
court's nonobviousness jurisprudence.
This Article comes to these conclusions in the following manner.
First, in Part I, the Article provides a background on the nonobviousness requirement, the suggestion test, and recent criticism. Part II of
the Article describes the empirical study, including the parameters
used and the study's limitations. Part III of the Article reports the
study's findings, starting first with the macro-level study's results and
then micro-level study's results. The Article then provides a detailed
conclusion, reiterating the more significant findings from the study.
l.

A.

BACKGROUND

Basics of the Nonobviousness Requirement

The nonobviousness 9 requirement in patent law has been termed
"the ultimate condition for patentability." 10 An invention must be
more than just new and useful, it must also be of"a significant enough
technical advance to merit the award of a patent." 11 The non obviousness requirement also "ask[s] whether an invention likely would
emerge in roughly the same time frame-that is, without significant
delay-'but for' the prospect of the patent." 12 The requirement
ensures that a patent is granted for only those inventions that would
have not been created but for the incentive of patent protection.
9 The term "nonobviousness" is used to define the inquiry to determine whether
an invention is nonobvious or obvious. For the purposes of this Article, the term
nonobviousness does not indicate the ultimate conclusion that a claimed invention is
nonobvious, and thus eligible for patent protection.
10 See NoNOBVIOUSNEss-THE ULTIMATE CoNDITION oF PATENTABILI"IY Qohn F.
Witherspoon ed., 1980).
11 RoBERT PATRICK MERGEs & joHN FITZGERALD DuFFY, PATENT LAw AND PoucY
644 (3d ed. 2002).
12 FED. TRADE CoMM'N, supra note 3, ch. 4, at 6; see also id., ch. 4, at 7-8 (asserting
that this "but for" test instituted by the nonobviousness requirement ensures a proper
balance between patent protection and competition).
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The requirement ensures that patent protection is not given to
inventions that have no social benefit because they are of minimal
advance over what has already been done and "others would have
developed the idea even without the incentive of a patent." 13 Providing protection for obvious ideas is socially harmful because it can lead
to "a proliferation of economically insignificant patents that are
expensive to search and to license." 14 Protection for obvious advances
skews the patent system's incentive structure-focusing would-be
inventors on minor developments as opposed to significant technological advances. These obvious patents provide little benefit to society
due to their coverage of insignificant subject matter and clog the
inventive pathways to highly beneficial technological advances.
Nonobviousness, therefore, is an important requirement for
protection in the United States' patent system. 15 The doctrine plays a
central role in deciding which inventions are patentable, and thus get
a limited period of exclusivity, and those that do not. While initially a
common law requirement, the test for nonobviousness was codified by
the 1952 Patent Act. 16 The statutory test for nonobviousness indicates
that:
A patent may not be obtained ... if the differences between the
subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that
the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time
the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art
to which said subject matter pertains. 17

The Supreme Court, in Graham v. John Deere Co., 18 addressed 35
U.S.C. § 103 and explained the process for determining nonobviousness.19 The Court noted that § 103 "lends itself to several basic factual
inquiries." 20 There factual inquiry included: (1) identifying the "scope
and content of the prior art''; (2) determining the "differences
between the prior art and the claims"; and (3) ascertaining "the level
13 MERGES & DuFFY, supra note 11, at 646; see also Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Patent
Law, the Federal Circuit, and the Supreme Court: A Quiet Revolution, 11 SuP. CT. EcoN. REv.
1, 50-51 (2004) ("[A)n optimal uniform scheme of protection will provide protection
that will leave some desirable innovative products unprofitable.").
14 MERGES & DuFFY, supra note 11, at 647.
15 See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., .t'-Obviousness, 7 MrcH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REv.
363, 370 (2001).
16 35 u.s.c. § 103 (2000).
17 Jd.§103(a).
18 383 u.s. 1 (1966).
19 Jd.at12-l7.
20 ld. at 17.
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of ordinary skill in the pertinent art." 21 The Court then indicated that
"[a] gainst this background, the obviousness or nonobviousness of the
subject matter is determined." 22 Secondary considerations are then
considered. 23
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 24 and
its predecessor court, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, developed a structured approach to making the final determination of nonobvious or obvious-the "suggestion test. "25 Once the three initial
inquiries articulated in Graham are made, Federal Circuit case law
requires a showing that there is some "reason, suggestion, or motivation" that would have led a person of ordinary skill in the art to combine the relevant art teachings to make the patented invention. 26 The
Federal Circuit has made the suggestion test a required component of
any nonobviousness analysis in a patent infringement litigation and
part of the prima facie case of obvious during patent examination
before the USPT0. 27 The suggestion test provides an analytical tool
to determine when the jump can properly be made from defining the
relevant prior art, the skill in the art, and differences between the art
and the invention to a conclusion of obvious. 28 A finding of obvi21 !d.
22 !d. This quote from the Supreme Court demonstrates how the term "nonobviousness" can also be used to define the ultimate conclusion in a nonobviousness analysis. For the sake of clarity, this Article will attempt to use the term "nonobviousness"
to only define the inquiry itself, not the result.
23 !d. at 17-18.
24 The Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction over patent appeals. See 28
U.S.C. § 1295(a) (2000). But see Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys.,
Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 831-32 (2002) (removing cases with only patent law counterclaims
out of the Federal Circuit's exclusive jurisdiction).
25 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 5.04[1)[e] (2005); see also In re
Fridolph, 134 F.2d 414, 416 (C.C.P.A. 1943) ("In considering more than one reference ... the question always is: does such art suggest doing the thing which the
[inventor] has done?").
26 Pro-Mold & Tool Co. v. Great Lakes Plastics, Inc., 75 F.3d 1568, 1573 (Fed. Cir.
1996).
27 Id.; In reThrift, 298 F.3d 1357, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
28 One of the main goals of the suggestion test also is to combat against hindsight
bias. In re Dembiczak, 175 F.3d 994, 999 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (" [T] he best defense
against the subtle but powerful attraction of a hindsight-based obviousness analysis is
rigorous application of the requirement for a showing of the teaching or motivation
to combine prior art references."). Hindsight bias is a significant problem in the
nonobviousness analysis. See Gregory Mandel, Patently Non-Obvious: Empirical Demonstration that the Hindsight Bias Renders Patent Decisions Irrational, 67 OHio ST. LJ. 1391,
1403-06 (2006) [hereinafter Mandel, Empirical Demonstration] (finding empirical data
to support the existence of hindsight bias). Professor Mandel's most recent experimentation with mock jurors found that hindsight bias is so strong that even the sug-
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ousness cannot be made unless there is some impetus-that is a suggestion, teaching, or motivation-to make the leap from what is
found in the individual pieces of prior art to the invention for which
patent protection is sought.
B.

Recent Criticism of the Federal Circuit's Nonobviousness jurisprudence

Much of the current discussion regarding nonobviousness
focuses on the Federal Circuit. The court's jurisprudence in this area,
and in particular the court's application of the suggestion test, is the
target of this recent scrutiny. The court's case law is the center of two
recent reports, one by the Federal Trade Commission and the other
by the National Research Council. 29 It is also the subject of a
currently pending case before the Supreme Court, KSR International
Co. v. Teleflex, Inc. 30 The general conclusion of the two reports and
the briefing in support of certiorari in KSR is that the Federal Circuit
has improperly relaxed the nonobviousness requirement. 31 The court
has made it easier to find a claimed invention nonobvious and, as a
result, obtain and enforce a patent. One of the alleged causes of this
reduction in the nonobviousness standard is the suggestion test
employed by the court.
The FTC's 2003 report notes a "perceived .
trend since the
advent of the Federal Circuit toward reducing the size of the step
required for patentability-that is, reducing the rigor of the nonobviousness standard." 32 As a result, the report concludes that more obvious patents are being issued by the USPTO and held valid by the
court. 33 The NRC's 2004 report comes to a similar, yet qualified,
conclusion. 34 "[T]here might have been some dilution of the application of the non-obviousness standard in biotechnology and some limitations on its proper application to business methods patent
applications," and, as a result, patent quality is suffering. 35 The petigestion test may be unable to fully mitigate its effects in all cases. See Gregory Mandel,
Patently Non-Obvious II: Experimental Study on the Hindsight Issue Before the Supreme Court
in KSR v. Teleflex, 9 YALEj. OF L. & TECH. 1, 16 (2007) [hereinafter Mandel, Experimental Study].
29 See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
30 Teleflex, Inc. v. KSR lnt'l Co., 119 F. App'x 282 (Fed. Cir. 2005), cert. granted,
126 S. Ct. 2965 (2006).
31 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 4, 10-11, KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc.,
No. 04-1350 (U.S. Apr. 6, 2005).
32 See FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 3, ch. 4, at 9.
33 Jd. at 8-9.
34 See NAT't. REsEARCH CouNCIL, supra note 3, at 3.
35 /d.
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tion for certiorari in KSR, and the amici that supported the petition,
all come to a similar conclusion-the Federal Circuit relaxed the nonobviousness requirement. 36 The United States, which filed a brief in
support of certiorari, specifically asserts that the Federal Circuit's nonobviousness jurisprudence establishes "an inflexible requirement for
determining obviousness" that causes patent protection to extend to
"non-innovative combinations of familiar elements. " 37
These reports and briefs all argue, at least in part, that the
Federal Circuit's suggestion test causes this relaxation of the nonobviousness requirement. 38 Because a suggestion must be found to hold a
claimed invention obvious, the suggestion test works as a "one-way
ratchet." 39 It only acts as an obstacle to an obvious finding and, thus,
increases the likelihood of an erroneous nonobvious finding. The
Federal Circuit has also limited the suggestion test to suggestions in
the prior art, ignoring other, undocumented sources such as ordinary
skill. 40 This increases the difficulty in finding a patent obvious,
further lowering the nonobviousness standard. 41 Limiting the scope
of viable suggestions makes it extremely difficult to find claims invalid
that involve technologies, such as business methods, where there is
little memorialized and publicly available knowledge. 42 Additionally,
36 See Brief of Amici Curiae Cisco Systems Inc., General Motors Corp., Hallmark
Cards, Inc., Fortune Brands, Inc., and Electrolux North America in Support of Reversal at 1, KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., No. 04-1350 (U.S. Aug. 22, 2006), 2006 WL
2452365 (noting that the Federal Circuit established "too lax a standard for patentabilityn); Brief of Intellectual Property Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioner at 9-10, No. 04-1350, KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., No. 04-1350 (U.S. Aug.
22, 2006), 2006 WL 2452369; Brief of Amicus Curiae The Progress & Freedom Foundation in Support of the Petitioner at 8-12, KSR, No. 04-1350 (U.S. Aug. 22, 2006),
2006 WL 2452361 (arguing that the Federal Circuit's case law is biased toward finding
a claimed invention nonobvious); Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 31, at
24-27 (citing both the ITC and NRC reports for support).
37 Brief of United States as Amicus Curiae at 9, KSR, No. 04-1350 (U.S. Aug. 22,
2006), 2006 WL 1455398.
38 See id. (indicating that the Federal Circuit "has transformed" the suggestion
test into "an inflexible requirementn that "extends patent protection to non-innovative combinations of familiar elements").
39 FED. TRADE CoMM'N, supra note 3, ch. 4, at 14 (citing the testimony of former
USPTO director Q. Todd Dickinson that the suggestion test operates as a "one-way
ratchet: it can help confirm obviousness, but it does not necessarily identity
nonobviousness").
40 See Brief of Intellectual Property Law Professors as Amicus Curiae in Support
of Petitioner, supra note 36, at 7-9.
41 /d.
42 See NAT'L REsEARcH CouNCIL, supra note 3, at 88-89 (noting that "[i]n an area
like business methods" the "published literature does not fully describe the state of
the art"). The NRC's report further notes that even when business method informa-
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obvious information is rarely documented because of its widely known
and uninteresting nature. Furthermore, the critics assert that by limiting the scope of possible suggestions to the prior art, the USPTO's
ability to properly assess nonobviousness is especially hampered. 43
The USPTO cannot rely upon its own scientific expertise and knowledge and must instead expend limited resources searching for suggestions in prior art. 44 This causes the USPTO to allow patent
applications that are, in truth, directed toward obvious inventions.
Finally, the factual nature of the suggestion test impinges on the ability of litigants to successfully dismiss invalid patents on summary judgment.45 This results in more unnecessary costs on patent players, the
judicial system, and society as a whole. 46
C.

Need for an Empirical Study of Recent Federal Circuit
Nonobviousness Case Law

Unfortunately, the FTC and NRC reports and the briefs in
support of the petition for certiorari in KSRfail to perform any empirical analysis to see if their conclusions are true-that the Federal Circuit had lowered the nonobviousness requirement and that the
suggestion test is the cause. 47 The reports and criticism cited above
are based on the "feel" of the case law48 or the facts of the KSR case
alone. 49 An empirical study that systemically looks at both the
tion is published, it is mostly likely that "non-obvious information" is published. Id. at
90.
43 See Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 37, at 17-18; see also
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Obvious to Whom? Evaluating Inventions from the Perspective of
PHOSITA, 19 BERKELEY TECH. LJ. 885, 888 (2004) ("The resulting analysis excludes
from consideration the judgment, intuition, and tacit knowledge of ordinary practitioners in the field that cannot be documented in the written record."); Arti K Rai,
Allocating Power over ~Fact-Finding in the Patent System, 19 BERKELEY TECH. LJ. 907,
912-17 (2004) (describing the "key problem" of the "Federal Circuit's failure to
recognize that the USPTO can, and should, be allowed to insert its knowledge of the
art into the patent examination process.").
44 See NAT'L REsEARCH CouNCIL, supra note 3, at 88-89 (concluding that the
USPTO is "severely handicapped").
45 See Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 37, at 17 (stating
that " [ t) he Federal Circuit's test nevertheless prevents summary resolution of
(nonobviousness] ").
46 See id.
47 The NRC's report admits that no empirical analysis has been done. NAT'L
REsEARcH CouNciL, supra note 3, at 3.
48 See FED. TRADE CoMM'N, supra note 3, ch. 4, at 12.
49 See Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 37, at 12-15 (noting
that the KSR case demonstrates the rigid application of the suggestion test and how it
results in an improper finding that the patent is obvious).
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broader question of whether the Federal Circuit has lowered the nonobviousness requirement and the narrow question of whether the suggestion test is the cause needs to be done.
Information produced from such an empirical study is particularly useful given the current discussions and the pending KSR case
before the Supreme Court. A good part of the calls for reform rest on
the assumptions that the Federal Circuit has lowered the nonobviousness bar and that the suggestion test is to blame. If these assumptions
are baseless, reforms produceCi from them will be misdirected and
inefficient and, as a result, unlikely to improve patent quality. Such
reforms may have negative effects. Changes in the area of nonobviousness, an already difficult doctrine to grasp and apply, 50 will only
muddy the doctrine, making nonobviousness determinations uncertain and unclear. In addition, focusing on the Federal Circuit's
nonobviousness jurisprudence and, specifically, the suggestion test
may simply waste resources and energy that are better directed to
other aspects of nonobviousness or other areas of patent law reform.
Making sure the problem with the current state of nonobviousness is
properly understood is the first step in nonobviousness reform.
Understanding the Federal Circuit's recent case law in the area takes
this first step.
This call for an empirical assessment is not to say that empirical
studies have never been done on nonobviousness. Professor Glynn
Lunney studied the Federal Circuit's nonobviousnessjurisprudence in
a 2001 article. 51 Professor Lunney's study examined the percentage
of patents found invalid by the Federal Circuit, and its predecessor
court and regional circuits, due to a finding of obviousness in eight
different years spread over a fifty-year period. 52 He found a drop in
the percentage of patents found obvious and attributed this drop to
the introduction of the Federal Circuit and the doctrinal changes to
nonobviousness the court introduced. 53 The study provides a great
50 See Graham v.John Deere Co., 383 U.S. I, 9 (1966) (ujefferson saw clearly the
difficulty in 'drawing a line between the things which are worth to the public the
embarrassment of an exclusive patent, and those which are not."' (quoting Letter
from Thomas jefferson to Issac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in 6 WRITINGS OF THOMAS
jEFFERSON 180-81 (H.A. Washington ed., New York, I857)));Joseph P. Meara, Note,
Just Who is the Person Having Ordinary Skill in the An? Patent Law's Mysterious Personage,
77 WASH. L. REV. 267, 272 (2002).
51 Lunney, supra note 15, at 370-75.
52 See id. (using previous studies to obtain data for the six pre-Federal Circuit data
points and collecting data for the final two Federal Circuit data points).
53 See id. at 372-80 (citing both the suggestion test and elevation of secondary
considerations as the doctrinal changes responsible for the reduction in obvious
findings).
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point of comparison to what is happening currently, but its last data
point is in 1994-1995. 54 Furthermore, the study looks no further than
the Federal Circuit's final holding on nonobviousness. 55 For example,
there is no investigation as to what the lower court's disposition was or
how the suggestion test was used by the Federal Circuit in the case.
The study provides some, but not much, assistance in evaluating the
recent claims by the FTC, NRC, and the petitioner and amici in KSR,
particularly with respect to the effects of the suggestion test. Professors John Alison and Mark Lemley also empirically looked at nonobviousness case law, but included district court opinions in the study. 56
Furthermore, the study does not focus on the suggestion test's role in
nonobviousness cases. While this study, like Professor Lunney's, adds
tremendous value to the nonobviousness discussion, it does not
directly address the current debate.
Recent empirical studies also add to the current discussion.
These all have some bearing on recent criticism of the Federal
Circuit's nonobviousness jurisprudence. But none fully address all
the issues presented in KSR and the ITC and NRC reports. Professor
Greg Mandel wrote two articles reporting on his experimentation
using mockjurors to determine the effects of hindsight on the nonobviousness analysis. 57 The first article looked at the hindsight question
in general, finding a significant hindsight effect in nonobviousness
determinations. 58 Professor Mandel's second study focused on the
ability of the suggestion test to ameliorate the hindsight bias. 5 9 While
Professor Mandel's studies focused on the hindsight bias, he obsenred
that the suggestion test cannot be the cause of erroneous findings of
nonobvious because mock jurors found inventions nonobvious with
and without the suggestion test. 60 Sean McEldowney recently pub54 ld. at 371, 373.
55 I d. at 370-71 (describing the study).
56 John R. Allison & Mark A Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated
Patents, 26 AIPLA QJ. 185, 194-97 (1998).
57 Mandel, Empirical Demonstration, supra note 28, at 1406-09; Mandel, Experimental Study, supra note 28, at ll-20.
58 Mandel, Empirical Demonstration, supra note 28, at 1409-10.
59 See Mandel, Experimental Study, supra note 28, at 15-20. He found that hindsight bias is so strong that even the suggestion test may be unable to fully mitigate its
effects in all cases. ld. at 16. He noted that the suggestion test may do more to
reduce the effects of hindsight bias in complex technology cases. ld. at 33. Recent
theoretical and empirical work supports this claim. See Cotropia, supra note 5 (manuscript at 64); Sean M. McEldowney, New Insights on the "Death» ofOlroiousness: An Empirical Study of District Court Olroiousness Opinions, 2006 STAN. TEcH. L. REv. 4, 'II 41, http:/
I stir. stanford.edu/STLR/Articles/06_STLR_4/McEldowney-Obviousness. pdf.
60 Mandel, Experimental Study, supra note 28, at 31-32.
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lished a study focusing on nonobviousness at the district court level. 61
McEldowney's findings show a decrease in the 1990s of both district
courts reaching the issue of nonobviousness and finding patents obvious.62 He found that, while this would appear to suggest that the nonobviousness requirement has lowered, there may be other forces at
play.63
Finally, a yet unpublished study by Professors Lee Petherbridge
and Polk Wagner comes the closest to fully addressing the questions
presented by recent criticism. 64 Professors Petherbridge and
Wagner's study takes a look at Federal Circuit nonobviousness cases
over a fifteen-year period, from 1990 through 2005. 65 While the study
takes a look at the claims of a lowering nonobviousness standard and
the suggestion test's role, the main thrust of the study is to determine
the stability and predictability of the court's nonobviousness doctrine.66 In reaching the conclusion that the doctrine is very stable, the
study also finds little evidence of a lowered standard or the suggestion
test acting as an obstacle to findings of obvious. 67
This very recent push to empirically study nonobviousness is
refreshing. There are still holes that need to be filled. A study is
needed that considers all of the recent Federal Circuit opinions that
span the period of the FTC and NRC reports and takes a complete
look at the impact of the suggestion test. This Article does just that.
Furthermore, when looking at the validity of empirical results, there is
benefit to overlapping studies. The results from an empirical study
becomes stronger if they are validated by another's results. In addition, the more ways nonobviousness is examined, the richer one's
understanding of the doctrine becomes.

61 McEldowney, supra note 59, 1 3.
62 Id.1 63.
63 ld. 1 64-67 (noting that "the Federal Circuit's doctrinal shifts in obviousness
seem more subtle and less damning than some have asserted" and that the regional
variation amongst results contradicts the assertion that "the Federal Circuit has effectively objectified obviousness").
64 See Petherbridge & Wagner, supra note 5 (manuscript at 5-20).
65 ld. (manuscript at 24-27). Notably, in contrast to the study reported in this
Article, Professors Petherbridge and Wagner's study does not collect data from Rule
36 cases and tallies results based on "analysis" as opposed to patents. I d. (manuscript
at 29-30, 44 tbl.5).
66 Id. (manuscript at 28-43) (noting that the "overall goal of this study is to contribute to a burgeoning body of literature that addresses the effectiveness of the Federal Circuit at meeting the goals mandated by Congress at the time of its creation").
67 Id. (manuscript at 51-53).
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II. . DESCRIPTION

OF THE STUDY

In order to fill the need for more information on the current
state of nonobviousness, a study of the Federal Circuit's recent nonobviousness jurisprudence is performed. The basic goal is to capture
and code all Federal Circuit decisions on nonobviousness over a
defined period. This population creates a data set that hopefully
provides a better insight into whether the Federal Circuit has lowered
the nonobviousness requirement and what role the suggestion test
plays in the doctrine.
A.

Parameters of the Study

This study contains a defined population of written, final decisions of the Federal Circuit issued over a four-year period, from January l, 2002 through December 31, 2005. 68 Only validity decisions are
included in the study, not decisions on unenforceability, such as inequitable conduct, prosecution laches, or patent misuse. 69 The population of this study initially includes only final decisions on validity, not
vacations or remands-all decisions where the issue of a patent's validity is still unsetded. The population is then expanded to include
those non-final decisions that reach any substantive conclusion on the
issue of non obviousness. 70 Thus, opinions where a holding of nonobviousness is vacated are included in the study. The population 1s
68 The study's results on are file with the author and are available at
http:/ /www.cotropia.com/nonobviousnessstudy.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2007).
The cases were obtained by searching LexisNexis's Federal Circuit database over
this four-year period fo:;>r cases that included the terms "patent" and "infring!" to
gather appeals from patent infringement cases and the term "patent" in the "In re"
cases to gather appeals from the USPTO's determinations regarding applications,
reissues, and reexaminations. An additional search was made to capture appeals from
decisions by the USPTO in interferences-disputes as to inventorship of a claimed
invention. See Thomas P. Noud et al., Patent Law Issues Affected by the Predictability of
Technology in the Field of Invention, 88 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'v 603, 612 (2006)
("A patent interference is an administrative proceeding that results in an award of
priority to one of the parties" who is claiming to be the first to invent.).
69 For example, fifteen patents held unenforceable due to prosecution laches in
Symbol Technologies, Inc. v. Lemelson Medical t.'ducation & Research Foundation, 422 F.3d
1378, 1384-86 (Fed. Cir. 2005), were not included in this study.
70 Specifically excluded from this expanded population are cases where the issue
of nonobviousness arose in the setting of preliminary injunctions. Such cases were
avoided due to the unique standard under which substantive issues are judged when
reviewing preliminary injunctions. See Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com,
Inc., 239 F.3d 1343, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (noting that because of the differing level
of review, "[v]alidity challenges during preliminary injunction proceedings can be
successful, that is, they may raise substantial questions of invalidity, on evidence that
would not suffice to support a judgment of invalidity at trial").
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expanded to include these additional opinions so as to capture all of
the Federal Circuit's deliberations on the issue of nonobviousness
over the four-year period.
The study includes both published and unpublished written opinions. Summary affirmances, "Rule 36" cases, 71 are also included in the
population to the extent information regarding the issues decided by
the court can be discerned from appellate briefs and the published
decisions below. 72 Only those decisions involving utility patents, as
opposed to design or plant patents, are included. In addition, results
will be separated based on whether it is an appeal from a patent
infringement decision by a United States district court or an affirmed
final rejection or interlerence decision of the USPT0. 73
The study is defined in terms of patents, not cases. 74 Often opinions included decisions on the nonobviousness of more than one
patent, and thus one opinion may result in more than one data point.
In addition, in those cases where decisions varied with regard to an
individual patent's claims-that is, some claims were found nonobvious while others found obvious-each set of validated or invalidated
claims are counted as a single patent. Therefore, for some cases, a
decision regarding one patent may be defined as two patents for the
purpose of the study.
71 Federal Circuit Rule 36 allows judgment of affirmance without opinion when
certain conditions exist and an opinion would have no precedential value. See Beth
Zeitlin Shaw, Note, Please Ignore This Case: An Empirical Study of Nonprecedential Opinions
in the Federal Circuit, 12 Gw. MAsoN L. REv. 1013, 1015 (2004) (noting that Rule 36
allows the court to affirm without opinion when ~the court determines an opinion
would have no precedential value, and any of five other conditions exist").
72 Whether validity, and more particularly nonobviousness, was at issue in the
Rule 36 cases is discernable from the briefing to the court. The only information
lacking for such cases is the specific reasoning for the Federal Circuit affirming the
lower court's ruling on validity.
The inclusion of Rule 36 cases considering nonobviousness, of which there were
twenty-four, is a significant difference between this study and the one performed by
Professors Petherbridge and Wagner. See Petherbridge & Wagner, supra note 5
(manuscript at 29-30) (noting that their results would change with the addition of
Rule 36 opinions to their data set).
73 Decisions from United States International Trade Commission are included
with the appeals from United States District Courts. There was, however, only one
such decision involving the issue of nonobviousness. See Honeywell lnt'l, Inc. v. Int'l
Trade Comm'n, 341 F.3d 1332, 1338-42 (Fed. Cir. 2003). In addition, USPTO
appeals included in the study were those from normal prosecution, reissues, and reexaminations. Appeals from interferences were also included to the extent that the
validity of the count was at issue.
74 This is another difference between this study and that performed by Professors
Petherbridge and Wagner. See Petherbridge & Wagner, supra note 5 (manuscript at
25) (indicating that "their measurement metric is analyses").
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B.

Data Collected

For each patent in the population, the following data was
collected from all of the Federal Circuit's opinions:
(l) case name, citation, and date of issuance;
(2) whether the patent was held nonobvious or obvious;
(3) whether the judgment below was from the grant of summary
judgment, the grant of a judgment as a matter oflaw QMOL), a bench
trial, or a jury trial;
(4) whether the Federal Circuit affirmed, reversed, or vacated the
lower tribunal's determination regarding nonobviousness;
(5) the reason the Federal Circuit affirmed, reversed, or vacated
the lower tribunal's nonobviousness determination. 75
C.

Methodology

This is a population study, like those previously conducted by
Professors Allison and Lemley76 and Christian Chu. 77 The study
generates descriptive statistics to better understand the court's nonobviousness jurisprudence over the last four years. Statistical testing on
these descriptive statistics is also performed. This analysis provides
further information about the population and the significance of any
variations in nonobviousness decisions over the past four years.
This population can be treated as a subset of a "superpopulation," as has been done in previous patent law studies by Professors
Allison, Lemley and Chu. 78 That is, the population of this study can
be used to predict the "population of an past and future . . . decisions."79 The study can make predictions on the court's nonobviousness jurisprudence of the past and the future. By both focusing on
the descriptive statistics the study produced and the inferences from
statistical testing on the population studied, a better understanding of
the court's nonobviousness jurisprudence will hopefully emerge.

75 Because of their summary nature, this information was not available for Rule
36 cases. In those cases, the reason was coded as unknown.
76 Allison & Lemley, supra note 56, at 201-02.
77 Christian A Chu, Empirical Analysis of the Federal Circuit's Claim Construction
Trends, 16 BERKELEY TECH. Lj. 1075, 1094-95 (2001).
78 Allison & Lemley, supra note 56, at 201-02; Chu, supra note 77, at 1094.
79 Allison & Lemley, supra note 56, at 194 n.20.

200']]

NONOBVIOUSNESS AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

D.

Limitations

As with most empirical studies, this study suffers from a number

of limitations. The limitations are divided into two categories-population biases and inherent limitations. 80
1.

Population Biases

A major complaint one may lodge against this study is that the
population selected is too narrow. First, a more complete picture of
the Federal Circuit's nonobviousness jurisprudence would emerge if
all of the court's jurisprudence was included, and thus all nonobviousness cases should be included back to and beyond the court's creation
in 1982. 81 It is true, more years would have provided a fuller picture.
But, the four-year period selected contains a good number of patents
subject to nonobviousness findings-102 patents from district court
cases and 72 from the USPTO. Furthermore, while information from
the 1980s and 1990s is nice, the focus of the current debate is on the
Federal Circuit's recent jurisprudence. It matters little what the
court's take on nonobviousness was twenty years ago. The important
question is what is the Federal Circuit's attitude toward nonobviousness now, and this study defines its population in a way to best capture
and test the current jurisprudence.
Another potential problem with the study is that the population
should be expanded to include district court cases, decisions by the
USPTO's Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences {the Board), and
even reasons allowances by individual USPTO examiners. Looking at
all of these determinations of nonobviousness would provide the
complete picture of the current state of the doctrine. 8 2 In addition,
those cases heard by the Federal Circuit, particularly from the
USPTO, are a small fraction of the nonobviousness determinations
made in the United States on patent applications. Such appeals are
80 Such a division is the same as that identified by Professors Allison and Lemley
in their validity study. See id. at 202-05.
81 Professors Petherbridge and Wagner attempt to overcome this limitation in
their study, including cases from 1990 to 2005. Petherbridge & Wagner, supra note 5
(manuscript at 22). However, their study does not expand over the full period of the
Federal Circuit's existence and include the case law before the court's creation,
hampering its ability to obtain a "complete" picture of nonobviousness. !d. Other
empirical studies have attempted to do just that, but either do not include recent data
or focus only on district court cases. See, e.g., Lunney, supra note 15, at 370-75 (focusing on eight time periods with 1994-1995 being the most recent); McEldowney, supra
note 59, at 1[1[ 22-28 (focusing on district court opinions).
82 A recent study by McEldowney, mentioned earlier, examines district court
cases. See McEldowney, supra note 59, at ~1 22-28.
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also self-selecting, influenced by decisions by litigators and patent
examiners, all of which arguably pollute the integrity of the data collected from these cases.
These are all valid points, and a more complete study, particularly
one that focuses on nonobviousness decisions made inside the
USPTO, would provide an especially valuable insight into how the
doctrine is really used in the patent system. But this study focuses on
what recent reports, the KSR case, and most patent players focus onrecent decisions by the Federal Circuit. Reported and published decisions, particularly those by an appellate court, both directly and indirectly shape both one's understanding and expectations of the law. 83
The nature of the common law and stare decisis requires lower tribunals to pay attention to and follow the precedent of appellate courts. 84
Furthermore, published decisions by an appellate court are some of
the only views would-be litigants have as to how their disputes may be
decided, and thus inform their actions under the law. 85 This is all
particularly true in the case of patent law and the Federal Circuit,
where the Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction over all patent
appeals86 and has been referred to, on more than one occasion, as the
"Supreme Court of patent law."87 Put simply, this study focuses on the
Federal Circuit for the same reason recent criticism, the Supreme
Court in KSR, and patent players are focused on the Federal Circuitthe court's opinions set the tone for patent law in the United States.
83 Michael Heise, The Importance of Being E-mpirical, 26 PEPr. L. REv. 807, 826
(1999) ("An important function of written published judicial opinions is to shape
future litigants' expectations and predictions about what might happen if their case
should proceed to trial. Moreover, these expectations and predictions in tum influence the nuanced decisional analyses about whether to even initiate, let alone litigate,
potential legal claims.").
84 See Pin tip Hompluem Dunn, Note, How Judges Ovmule: Speech Act Theary and the
Doctrine of Stare Decisis, 113 YALE LJ. 493, 498 (2003) (noting that "in the common
law . . . the only texts that judges can reference are the texts of earlier judicial
opinions~).

85 See Ahmed E. Taha, Publish or Paris? Evidence of How judges Allocate Their Time, 6
AM. L. & EcoN. REv. 1, 2 (2004) (concluding that "the small percentage of judges'
decisions that are published are responsible for changes in law and for most observers' perceptions of the federal court system"); id. at 7 ( [P] ublished decisions are more
likely to be read and cited by the legal community.").
86 28 U.S.C. § l295(a) (2000). The court's exclusivity in the area has been
eroded. See, e.g., Christopher A. Cotropia, "Arising Under" jurisdiction and Uniformity in
Patent Law, 9 MICH. TEL.ECOMM. & TECH. L. REv. 253 (2003) (discussing the effect of
the Supreme Court's decision in Holmes Group, Inc. v. Varnado Air Circulation Sys., Inc.,
535 U.S. 826 (2002)).
87 Donald S. Chisum, The Supreme Court and Patent Law: Does Shallow Reasoning
Lead to Thin Law?, 3 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REv. 1, 2 (1999).
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Inherent Limitations

There are other limitations to this study that are not directly
attributable to the population selected. The first limitation is the
study's inability to determine the "correct" result in each of the nonobviousness decisions collected. A complete study that wanted to see
if the Federal Circuit truly lowered the nonobviousness requirement
would collect nonobviousness decisions and compare their results to
the correct result under a proper standard for a given set of facts. A
lowered requirement would result in a significantly lower number of
findings of obviousness in reported decisions as compared to the correct decision for those cases.
Put frankly, such an inquiry on a large scale does not appear possible. Nonobviousness is a very fact-intensive inquiry that depends on
the technologies involved and the skill level of those of ordinary skill
in the art. 88 The doctrine's "intensely fact-dependent nature . . .
makes it difficult to determine whether a decision ... is incorrect." 89
This is not to say that it is impossible to arrive at a correct nonobviousness decision. It just means that in order to empirically test the correctness of each Federal Circuit decision, one would need an
incredible level of expertise in various technologies and a tremendous
amount of time.
Another limitation to this study pertains to its predictive power,
or lack thereof. As noted by Professors Allison and Lemley in their
validity study, "even the best predictive efforts in this area encounter
fundamental limitations imposed by the fact that law and the litigation
process change over time." 90 This study can describe, and attempt to
predict, what happened over the four years of collected data. The
information it provides outside that four-year period, particularly
going forward, should be taken with caution. Things can, and do,
change. However, this study is making the same predictions recent
reports and arguments before the Supreme Court in KSR are making-indicating what the Federal Circuit has done and that this will be
what it continues to do in the future. 91
In the end, this study's main goal is to provide a clearer picture of
the recent case law that was. The Article will make inferences as to
88 St:~ In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 987-88 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
89 Meara, supra note 50, at 280; see also Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 18
(1966) (noting that "[w]hat is obvious is not a question upon which there is likely to
be uniformity of thought in every given factual contexn.
90 Allison & Lemley, supra note 56, at 205.
91 See supra Part I.B.
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what this case law means for what will be. But, these inferences will, in
the end, be simply that-inferences.

III.

REsuLTS OF THE STUDY

Using the population and data set defined in Part II, this Article
tests the current assertion that the Federal Circuit reduced the nonobviousness requirement and that the suggestion test is the cause of this
reduction. This assertion is tested in two ways. First, a macro-level
view of the Federal Circuit's recent nonobviousness jurisprudence is
taken. All of the opinions over the study's four-year period that
include any determination on the issue of nonobviousness are
examined. The macro-level study takes note of the Federal Circuit's
final decision for each patent-findings of either nonobvious or obvious-and whether the decision affirms, reverses, or vacates the lower
tribunal's decision. The study makes the assumption that if the Federal Circuit has lowered the nonobviousness bar, one would expect
more findings of nonobvious than obvious and, similarly, significantly
more affirmances of nonobvious than obvious. 92 Put another way, the
court's behavior would evidence a bias towards lower court and
USPTO decisions of finding a patent claim nonobvious.
Then a micro-level study is performed, where, instead of merely
looking at outcomes for each patent, the reasoning of the decisions
on nonobviousness over the study's four-year period is explored. 93
Specifically, the importance of the suggestion test to nonobviousness
determinations is examined. In cases where the Federal Circuit finds
the claimed invention nonobvious, or reverses or vacates a finding of
obvious, the decision is read to see if the suggestion test prompted this
outcome. The study tries to capture how outcome determinative the
suggestion test is in nonobviousness findings. The suggestion test's
impact on nonobviousness determinations on summary judgment is
also investigated.
Both the macro- and micro-level studies are described and analyzed in turn, focusing first on appeals from patent infringement cases
and then on appeals from the USPTO.
92 The validity of this assumption will be discussed in detail below. See infra notes
108-11 and accompanying text.
93 The "micro-level" study basically performs content analysis of the opinions in
the database, looking at the specific analysis on each patent at issue. Professors
Petherbridge and Wagner pioneered the use of the technique in patent law. See R
Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding? An Empirical Assessment ofjudicial Peiformance, 152 U. PA. L. REv. 1105 (2004).
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Does the Federal Circuit Employ a Low Nonobviousness Requirement?
Results From the Macro-Level Study

This macro-look at the Federal Circuit's nonobviousness jurisprudence attempts to inform the discussion on whether the Federal Circuit has relaxed the nonobviousness requirement in the following
manner. First, the affirmance, reversal, and vacation rates over the
past four years for appeals from findings of nonobvious are compared
to those from findings of obvious. If the court has lowered the bar,
one would expect a statistically significant difference between the way
the Federal Circuit handles nonobvious findings as compared to obvious findings. The Federal Circuit would favor, and thus affirm more
often, findings of nonobvious and disfavor, and thus reverse or vacate
more often, findings of obvious. 94 In addition, the lowering of the
nonobviousness bar would also present itself in the aggregation of the
holdings by the court in these cases-with findings of non obvious outnumbering findings of obvious. 95
1.

Appeals from Patent Infringement Cases

In appeals from patent infringement cases, there were 199 patents that were the subject of a final judgment regarding their validity.
Of these 199 final validity decisions, sixty-seven were final determinations on the issue of nonobviousness. Added to these sixty-seven final
determinations were fifteen patents whose finding of nonobvious was
vacated and twenty patents whose findings of obvious were vacated.
With these added to the population, there were a total of 102 patents
that were subjected to some determination on the issue of nonobviousness over the study's four-year period. Of these 102 patents:
( 1) 4 7.05% (forty-eight) were the subject of a lower court finding
of nonobvious while 52.94% (fifty-four) were the subject of a lower
court finding of obvious;96
94 Notably, this comparison and statistical test of this comparison was not performed by Professors Petherbridge and Wagner. Their study simply reported the
aggregate of affirmances, reversals, and vacations because their goal was to determine
doctrinal stability, not the level of the nonobviousness standard. Petherbridge & Wagner, supra note 5 (manuscript at 31-33).
95 Again, the various limitations to this assumption-a difference in nonobvious
and obvious holdings indicates the level of the nonobviousness standard-will be discussed in detail below. See infra notes 108-11 and accompanying text.
96 The almost even spread between lower court decisions finding a patent claim
nonobvious and those finding a patent claim obvious falls right in line with Professors
Priest and Klein's model. George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes
for Litigation, 13J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 9-17 (1984) (defining what has come to be known
as the fifty-percent rule). It also comes dose to the observed overall validity rate by
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(2) 62.5% (thirty) of the nonobvious determinations were
affirmed by the Federal Circuit, while 6.25% {three) were reversed
and 31.25% (fifteen) were vacated; and
(3) 48.15% (twenty-six) of the obvious determinations were
affirmed by the Federal Circuit, while 12.96% {seven) were reversed
and 38.89% (twenty-one) were vacated.
Looking at the descriptive data, there appears to be a slight bias
favoring lower court nonobvious findings. The affirmance rate is
higher, and the reversal and vacation rate is lower as compared to
appeals from obvious findings. However, the question is whether this
difference is statistically significant. In order to determine whether it
is, a Fisher's Exact Test is performed on the data. 97

Professors Allison and Lemley. See Allison & Lemley, supra note 56, at 205-06
(observing, from a set of 300 final validity decisions, 162 (54%) patents found valid
compared to 138 (46%) patents found invalid).
Of even further interest is comparing the even split observed in these recent
district court cases to the more lopsided distribution Professors Allison and Lemley
observed with regards to nonobviousness. While a fifty-fifty split was observed over
this study's four-year period, from 2002 to 2005, Professors Allison and Lemley
observed more findings ofnonobvious, with 160 patents (63.7%) being found nonobvious and 58 patents (36.3%) being found obvious between 1989 to 1996. ld. at 209.
This suggests that at the district court level the likelihood of an obvious challenge
being successful has increased in recent years, at least as compared to the early to
mid-1990s.
97 A Fisher's Exact Test is chosen over the Pearson's Chi-Squared Test to measure
statistical significance because of the small population size and, sometimes, highly
unbalanced tables, produced by this study. B.S. EVERITT, THE ANALYSIS OF CoNTINGENCY TABLES 7, 15-16 (2d. ed 1992); GEORGE W. SNEDECOR & WILLIAM G. CocHRAN,
STATISTICAL METHODS 126-27 (8th ed. 1989) (explaining that the Fisher's Exact Test
is favored over the Chi-Squared Test for smaller expected frequencies) .
Fisher's Exact Test requires a 2x2 table, and thus this study will use a 2x2 table,
with the nonobvious and obvious findings by the lower court defining the two rows
and the aflirmance and reversal and vacation grouped together defining the two columns. Reversal and vacation were grouped to accommodate the 2x2 table requirement. This grouping does not disturb the validity of the results for two reasons. First,
both indicate that the Federal Circuit negatively viewed the lower court's conclusion.
While one treatment, reversal, clearly goes to the substance of the determination,
vacation also indicates at least a slight view towards the substance of the nonobviousness determination. Admittedly, the Federal Circuit could easily be vacating on
purely procedural grounds-there is still a genuine issue of material fact-when the
court may still substantively favor the lower court's outcome. See LG Elecs., Inc. v.
Bizcom Elecs., Inc., 453 F.3d 1364, 1380-81 (Fed. Cir. 2006). But, a vacation is still a
negative treatment of the decision below and, if the court has lowered the nonobviousness standard, it would likely vacate more findings of obvious and less findings of
nonobvious.
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The results of the Fisher's Exact Test produced a p-value of
0.1668, 98 indicating that the results did not show a significant difference between the Federal Circuit's handling of a lower court's finding
of nonobvious as compared to a finding of obvious. 9 9 Such a finding
suggests that there is no evidence of an inherent bias in the Federal
Circuit's nonobviousness jurisprudence that favors a finding of nonobvious or obvious. 100 The nonobviousness requirement cannot be
significantly low because if it was, presumably the distribution would
be statistically significant and tilt towards affirmance of findings of
nonobvious. This result is interesting because it fails to support the
presently held belief that the court's jurisprudence favors finding
patent claims nonobvious.
A similar finding is made when looking at the ultimate holdings
in nonobviousness cases over the study's four-year period. During this
time period, the Federal Circuit held thirty-seven patents nonobvious,
twenty-nine patents obvious, and vacated the lower court's holding for
thirty-six patents. Figure 1, below, depicts this breakdown graphically.

98 This is the two-tail p-value. Another test for statistical significance, the Pearson's Chi-Squared Test, produced a p-value of 0.2102 for the same 2x2 matrix, confirming the results of the Fisher's Exact Test-there is no statistically significant
relationship between the lower court's finding on nonobviousness and the Federal
Circuit's affirmance or reversal or vacation of the finding. See generally MICHEAL 0.
FINKELSTEIN & BRUCE LEVIN, STATISTICS FOR LAWYERS 157-62 (2d ed. 2001) (describing the Pearson's Chi-Squared Test).
This finding was also confirmed when the. negative treatments of the lower
court's findings was represented individually, defining a 2x3 matrix with the reversals
and vacations separated. The p-value using the Chi-Squared Test produced a p-value
of 0.2808, indicating no significant difference.
99 For the distribution to be statistically significant, a p-value must be less than
.05. See DAVID FREEDMAN ET AL., STATISTICS 484 (3d ed. 1998). A p-value less than .01
is considered highly statistically significant. Id.
100 The distribution is, instead, random, possibly mimicking the fifty-percent rule
that prompted close cases to go to trial and ultimately be appealed to the Federal
Circuit. See infra notes 104-07 and accompanying text.
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The percentage of patents found nonobvious is only slightly
higher than those found obvious-36.27% compared to 28.43%.
Ignoring the vacations, there is close to an even split between findings
of nonobvious and obvious-56.06% compared to 43.93%. This
frequency fails to support the claim that the nonobviousness requirement has lowered significantly.
What makes this lack of a strong bias particularly remarkable is
the presumption of validity issued patents enjoy. 101 A patent must be
found invalid not by just a preponderance of the evidence, but by
clear and convincing evidence. 102 Scholars and the FTC Report point
to this heightened standard as one of the main reasons invalid patents
are found valid by courts. 103 A finding of nonobvious is therefore
101 See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2000); Invitrogen Corp. v. Biocrest Mfg., L.P., 424 F.3d
1374, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
102 Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542, 1549 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (noting
that overcoming the presumption requires a showing of facts provided by clear and
convincing evidence).
103 See FED. TRADE CoMM'N, supra note 3, at 8-10 (recommending legislation to
reduce the standard to preponderance of the evidence); Mark A. Lemley, Rational
lr;norance at the Patent Office, 95 Nw. U. L. REv. 1495, 1497 (2001) (arguing that by
abolishing the strong presumption of validity, courts could make a more thorough
validity determination).
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heavily presumed, making an obvious finding by the Federal Circuit
inherently less likely regardless of the actual nonobviousness standard
employed. Because of this presumption, even a neutral nonobviousness standard should produce a greater percentage of patents being
held nonobvious. The results of this study only mildly mimic the
presumption, with the split between valid and invalid closer to almost
fifty-fifty, suggesting that if any bias exists, it is a bias towards finding
patents obvious, not nonobvious as most critics suggest.
However, the conclusion that these results, an almost even distribution between nonobvious and obvious findings, mean that the
nonobviousness standard has not been lowered must be qualified. By
looking at case outcomes, the study may simply be witnessing close
cases all centered around a low nonobviousness standard. Thus, the
study may say nothing about the level of the Federal Circuit's nonobviousness requirement.
As Professors George Priest and Benjamin Klein observed, litigants will only go to trial if the facts present a close case. 1 04 If the case
is not close, rational parties will settle. 105 Since only close cases go to
trial, the predicted success rate for such cases is fifty percent for the
plaintiff and fifty percent for the defendant. 106 This would indicate
that the cases that form the bases for this study are cases where the
issue of nonobviousness is close, suggesting that the Federal Circuit's
findings should break down the middle, with as many findings of nonobvious as obvious. The study comes close to confirming this
postulation. 107
When evaluating whether to go to trial or not, litigants will likely
take into account such things as the current nonobviousness standard
and the presumption of validity. The only cases that reach the courts
are those that are, taking into account all of the prevailing legal standards, coin-flips for the given set of facts. Put another way, the current legal standards, including the level of the nonobviousness
requirement, is subsumed in this decision calculus and thus does not
necessarily show up in the reported cases studied. If the nonobviousness bar is low, then only those cases where it is a dose call around
that low bar will be taken to trial and end up at the Federal Circuit. In
such an environment, the final results of this macro-level study can say
nothing about where the nonobviousness bar sits.
104 See Priest & Klein, supra note 96, at 9-17.
105 Id. at 17.
106 Id.
107 The district court results further confirm the fifty-percent rule on the issue of
nonobviousness. See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
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But this line of reasoning does not fully discount the significance
of the macro-level studies results. First, for this line of reasoning to
hold and a low nonobviousness standard to exist, all of the patents in
the study must hover around this lower nonobviousness standard and
are, as a result, invalid under the "correct" standard. Even the strongest critics of the Federal Circuit would be unlikely to make this claim.
All of the patents involved in this study are not "bad" patents. 108 Second, this critique rests on the assumption that litigants have a good
understanding of exactly where the nonobviousness bar sits. That is,
that their behavior follows Professors Priest and Klein's theory to the
letter. 109 It has been observed that, in practice, the fifty-percent rule
does not hold true. 11 ° Finally, if the Federal Circuit had lowered the
nonobviousness bar, and these results simply record litigants' understanding of this lowering, the Federal Circuit would have to communicate the lowering in some way. Finding more patents nonobvious as
opposed to obvious would be the likely vehicle through which to send
this message. As the results indicate, the message the Federal Circuit
has sent is that it is an even playing field, with patents as likely to be
found nonobvious as obvious.
Thus, a truly lowered bar or real bias towards finding patents
non obvious would likely result in a greater number of findings of nonobvious than obvious. This is not the case. The court's jurisprudence
appears to have not significantly pushed the doctrine towards one particular finding or another. The ultimate conclusion, that the nonobviousness requirement has not been lowered, cannot be conclusively
made based on the results of this macro-level study. But, the study, at
the very least, gives no indication that the opposite is true, as critics
argue-that the Federal Circuit has lowered the requirement.
This all being said, it is surprising, given the current discourse,
that an even distribution between findings of nonobvious and obvious
was observed. 111 Hopefully, the micro-level study112 will provide a bet108 See, e.g., Alza Corp. v. Mylan Labs, Inc., 391 F.3d 1365, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
(involving a patent on the transdermal administration of the narcotic drug fentanyl);
Atmel Corp. v. Silicon Storage Tech., Inc., 76 F. App'x 298, 300 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(considering a patent on a programmable semiconductor memory chip).
109 See Leandra Lederman, Which Cases Go to Trial?: An Empirical Study of Predictors
of Pailure to Settle, 49 CAsE W. REs. L. REv. 315, 322-23 (1999) (noting that Priest and
Klein's model "predicts that the close cases will be tried").
110 See David Kessler et al., Explaining Deviations from the Fifty-Percent Rule: A Multimodel Approach to the Selection of Cases for Litigation, 25 J. LEGAL STun. 233, 248-249
(1996).
Ill Professors Petherbridge and Wagner make a similar observation, albeit in passing. See Petherbridge & Wagner, supra note 5 (manuscript at 41-42) (finding a
higher frequency of obvious findings (57.8%) as compared to nonobvious findings
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ter insight as to whether the bar has been lowered by focusing on the
alleged cause of this lowering-the suggestion test.
2.

Appeals from the USPTO

In appeals from the Board of the USPTO, there were seventy-two
applications and issued patents that were the subject of a final determination regarding patentability or validity. Of these seventy-two
appealed patents and patent applications, fifty involved final determinations on the issue of nonobviousness. Added to these fifty final
determinations, there were four patent applications whose findings of
obviousness were vacated and remanded. With these decisions added
to the population, there were a total of fifty-four patents and patent
applications that were subjected to some determination on the issue
of nonobviousness over the four-year period of the study. Of these
fifty-four patents and patent applications:
( 1) all, 100% (one), of the nonobvious determinations were
affirmed by the Federal Circuit; and
(2) 86.79% (forty-six) of the obvious determinations were
affirmed by the Federal Circuit, while 5.66% (three) were reversed
and 7.55% (four) were vacated.
These data indicate that the Federal Circuit has not lowered the
nonobviousness bar with respect to the USPTO over the four-year
period. The high affirmance rate of findings of nonobvious is particularly telling. The descriptive statistics show that the Federal Circuit's
nonobviousness jurisprudence represents little to no obstacle to
affirming findings of obvious by the USPTO. When looking at the
outcome in all of the nonobviousness cases appealed from the
USPTO, the percentage of patent, or patent applications, found obvious by the Federal Circuit is extremely high. Figure 2, below, depicts
the final tally:

(42.4%)). The difference between this study's findings and Petherbridge and Wagner's may be explained by the period of time over which the samples were collected
or the inclusion of Rule 36 cases in this study. Regardless of the reason, Professor
Petherbridge and Wagner's finding of an almost even split validates this study's
results.
112 See infra Part III.B.l.
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Of further interest, the high rate of affirmance of obvious findings (86.79%) stands in stark contrast to the similar statistic in the
patent infringement case setting ( 48.15%). This indicates that the
Federal Circuit is even more likely to find a claim obvious in an appeal
from the USPTO than a district court. The statistical significance of
this difference is testable by performing a Fisher's Exact Test on the
handling of appeals from findings of obvious by district courts and the
USPTO. The result is a p-value of .0000266, indicating a highly statistically significant difference. USPTO obvious findings are more likely
to be affirmed than similar findings by district courts.
This difference can arguably be explained by the differing standards of review and the varying presumptions between the two types
of appeals. First, appeals from the USPTO are reviewed under the
Administrative Procedure Act's standard of review. 113 The ultimate
nonobviousness determination is a question of law, and thus reviewed
de novo by the Federal Circuit. 114 But the underlying factual determinations are reviewed for substantial evidence, a more deferential standard then those applied to summary judgments or JMOLs by district
113
114

See Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 164-65 (1999).
See In re Dembiczak, 175 F.3d 994, 998 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
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courts. 115 This greater deference applied to all USPTO's fact findings
could explain the higher rate of affirmance of obvious determinations. To add to this, most of the appeals from the USPTO involve
patent applications, as opposed to already issued patents, that are not
subject to the same strong presumption of validity as in district
court. 116 Finding a patent application invalid is thus much easier than
finding an issued patent invalid, making it easier for the Federal
Circuit to agree with a USPTO' s conclusion of obvious.
However, the FTC and NRC reports and the briefing in support
of certiorari in KSR argue that Federal Circuit jurisprudence has
made it particularly more difficult for the USPTO to find patent applications obvious. 117 If this assertion was true, one would expect a
higher degree of reversal of USPTO findings by the Federal Circuit.
Or, at the very least, that this lowering of the nonobviousness bar
would counteract the standard of review's and lack of a presumption's
push towards affirming a USPTO finding of obvious. This is clearly
not the case, with 86.79% of the USPTO's findings of obvious being
affirmed. The current thinking that the USPTO cannot, under the
current law, properly find a patent application invalid does not appear
to be supported. 1 1B
But, as with the district court results, these results may provide
little insight into whether the Federal Circuit has lowered the nonobviousness requirement. First, appeals from the USPTO do not tell the
full story. The alleged disparate impact of the Federal Circuit's jurisprudence, particularly In re Song-Su Lee, 119 may still be observed at the
Board level, or the individual examination level. That is, the USPTO's
hands may truly be tied by the Federal Circuit's jurisprudence and the
result is the issuance of obvious patents that are never reviewed by the
Federal Circuit. 120 The number of patent applications from the
115 Compare In re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305, 1313-16 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (establishing
the substantial evidence standard of review for appeals of facts from the USPTO), with
Hilgraeve Corp. v. McAfee Assocs., Inc., 224 F.3d 1349, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (noting
that summary judgments are reviewed de novo).
116 See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Aradigm Corp., 376 F.3d 1352, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2004)
("The general presumption of patent validity does not pertain to patent applications
before they issue.").
117 See supra notes 32-46 and accompanying text.
118 Professors Petherbridge and Wagner come to a similar conclusion, but in a
different manner, looking at the rate of reversal of USPTO decisions. Petherbridge &
Wagner, supra note 5 (manuscript at 37-38).
119 277 F.3d 1338, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (requiring the USPTO to provide
concrete evidence to support its conclusion of obvious).
120 The Board, or other parts of the USPTO, does not have the power to appeal
the issuance of a patent. Only an aggrieved inventor whose patent application has
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USPTO the Federal Circuit sees, and finds invalid, may be dwarfed by
the number of patent applications "improperly" granted by the
USPTO because of the Federal Circuit's case law.
The USPTO may also be operating under the lower standard, and
thus the cases coming up to the Federal Circuit have already taken the
standard into account. This masks the ability for the study to tease
out, from final holdings, the level of the nonobviousness standard.
The inability of the USPTO to appeal close cases also hampers the
study's ability to provide any insight into the court's jurisprudence.
But, in light of this high affirmance rate, patent applicants would
only go through the cost of appealing in those cases where they think
they have a good chance of winning. 121 Patent applicants would be
appealing stronger and stronger cases of nonobvious, testing the
height, or strength, of the standard. And even under this scenario,
the affirmance rate stays high, creating a viable inference that the
Federal Circuit is keeping the nonobviousness standard stiff, at least in
the context of the USPTO.
The high affirmance rate would, in turn, have the opposite effect
on the USPTO. The study shows that the OSPTO sees a high affirmance rate of its findings of obvious. This sends a message to the Board
and individual examiners that such findings of patent claims as obvious are supported, and that the support is strong. The USPTO is just
as likely to push in the other direction, feeling more and more comfortable finding the close case obvious. Both of these reactions would
create a pool of appealed cases from the USPTO that are testing how
high the nonobviousness standard can get, not how low.
The very high affirmance rate in response, thus, tells more than
the results from district court cases. These results bring the assertion
that the nonobviousness standard has been lowered into greater question. It also contradicts the specific assertion made by critics-that
the Federal Circuit's jurisprudence is particularly harmful to the
USPTO. These data indicate that the USPTO, at least at the Federal
Circuit level, does not have a particularly difficult time successfully
proving a patent claim obvious. In addition, these findings may
become more telling when combined with the micro-level study that
tests whether the bar has been lowered by the suggestion test.
been rejected may appeal the rejection to the Federal Circuit. See 35 U.S.C. § 141
(Supp. Ill 2003).
121 The average cost of appealing a patent application to the Board in 2005 was
$8,495. See AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAw Ass'N, REPORT OF THE EcoNOMIC SURVEY, at
I-98 (2005). While this cost may seem small, it may almost double the cost of patent
prosecution in some cases. See id. at l-95 (noting that the average cost of filing a
patent application is $11,218).
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B.

Does the Federal Circuit's "Suggestion Test" Lower the Nonobviousness
Requirement? Results From the Micro-Level Study

In addition to testing whether there is a general bias towards
nonobvious findings or a lowering of the bar in the Federal Circuit's
nonobviousness case law, the study also investigates the impact of the
court's suggestion test. Two specific claims regarding the suggestion
test are investigated. First, this "micro-level"I 2 2 part of the study tests
whether the suggestion test causes most, if not all, nonobvious findings. Put another way, it examines whether the suggestion test actually operates as a one-way ratchet in most nonobviousness cases.
Second, this part of the study examines whether the suggestion test
hinders the ability for nonobviousness determinations to be made on
summary judgment.
In order to gain information on whether the Federal Circuit actually uses the suggestion test, this micro-level part of the study first
focuses on cases in which the Federal Circuit either affirmed a finding
of nonobvious or reversed or vacated a finding of obvious over the
four-year period. The study focuses on these opinions because they
are the only cases where the suggestion test could have prompted a
finding favoring a conclusion of nonobvious. The study will then
consider the procedural mechanism through which the findings on
nonobviousness were made by the tribunal below-summary judgment, ]MOL, jut:y trial, or bench trial-and how the Federal Circuit
handled the lower court's decision. As with the macro-level study,
appeals from patent infringement cases are considered first, then
appeals from the USPTO .123

122 This part of the study is identified as "micro-level" because more data is taken
than just the outcome for each individual patent. The specific reasoning of the decision causing that particular outcome is examined and recorded. This low-level look at
a court's decisions-one termed "micro-level" but also known as content analysishas been done before in the patent context and in other areas of law. See, e.g., Petherbridge & Wagner, supra note 5 (manuscript at 5-20); Mark A. Hall & Ronald F.
Wright, Systematic Content Analysis ofjudicial Opinions, (Wake Forest Univ. Legal Studies Paper No. 913336, 2006), available at http:/ /ssm.com/abstract=913336 (advocating the use of a content-based method of evaluating caselaw).
123 However, for this part of the study, appeals from the USPTO will be ignored
when looking into the suggestion test's impact on summary judgment because there is
no directly equivalent mechanism in the USPTO. All USPTO decisions that get to the
Federal Circuit have gone through full adjudication.
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The Suggestion Test as the Cause of Nonobvious Findings
a.

Appeals in Patent Infringement Cases

In the study's population of patent infringement cases, there
were thirty patents for which the Federal Circuit affirmed a finding of
nonobvious, seven patents where a finding of obvious was reversed,
and twenty-one patents where a finding of obvious was vacated. In
total, there were fifty-eight patents for which the Federal Circuit either
ultimately found the patent claims nonobvious or vacated a finding of
obvious. This universe of opinions includes the only instances in
which the suggestion test could have prompted a conclusion of nonobvious or denied a conclusion of obvious. 1 2 4
The opinions concerning these patents were examined to determine the reasoning employed by the Federal Circuit to support its
final holding. 125 The reasoning was coded based on the part of the
nonobviousness analysis upon which the court relied to come to its
conclusion. The codes included:
(1) failure to meet the suggestion· test;
(2) secondary considerations rebutted a prima facie case of
obvious;
(3) elements of the claimed invention were not in the prior art;
( 4) claim interpretation was incorrect;
(5) other reason; 1 26 or
(6) unknown. 127
After looking at these data, another code was created for
instances where both the litigants failed to meet the suggestion test
124 There are twenty-nine other patents where the suggestion test clearly did not
cause a finding of nonobvious. These include twenty-six affirmances of a finding of
obvious and three reversals of a finding of nonobvious. These twenty-nine patents are
instances where the suggestion test did not act as a one-way ratchet and force a finding of nonobvious. More will be discussed about these additional findings below. See
infra text accompanying notes 131-32.
125 Professors Petherbridge and Wagner, while looking at the result of the use of
the suggestion test, do not investigate its specific usage in findings favoring nonobviousness. Petherbridge & Wagner, supra note 5 (manuscript at 43-49). Obtaining
and analyzing this additional data gives a fuller and more useful picture of the Federal
Circuit current nonobviousness doctrine.
126 In most instances, the "other reasons" were procedural. See, e.g., Catalina
Lighting, Inc. v. Lamps Plus, Inc., 295 F.3d 1277, 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (affirming a
holding of non obvious because the defendant failed to preserve the right to appeal
the nonobviousness issue).
127 The unknowns included all of the Rule 36 opinions where a finding of nonobvious was affirmed, but the conclusory nature of the ruling shed no light as to why the
court affirmed the holding.
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and secondary considerations rebutted a prima facie case. 128 The
results of this coding are represented graphically below in Figure 3. 129
FIGURE
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The descriptive statistics can be further categorized to gain a better handle on the extent to which the suggestion test causes a finding,
or possible finding, of nonobvious. All of those findings based, at
least in part, on a failure to meet the suggestion test are combined, 130
and all other findings, other than those whose reasoning is unknown,
are combined. The results of this combination are depicted below, in
Figure 4.

128 This is, most likely, an example of "piling on" by the court. See, e.g., PIN/NIP,
Inc. v. Patte Chern. Co., 304 F.3d 1235, 1245-47 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
129 The results in Figure 3 are normalized to the complete universe of patent
appeals from district courts where nonobviousness was at issue. Thus, the results are
depicted as percentages of this complete population-102 patents.
130 There were instances, as shown in Figure 3, where the Federal Circuit found
the suggestion test not met and found the presence of secondary considerations that
the patent claim was nonobvious.
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Disregarding the findings whose reasoning is unknown, there
exists an even split between those cases where the suggestion test
prompts a nonobvious-oriented finding and those cases where something else prompts such a finding. The suggestion test, it would therefore seem, plays a major role in the Federal Circuit's nonobviousness
jurisprudence.
The suggestion test does not, however, play as great of a role as
critics suggest. In almost as many situations a patent is found nonobvious because an element of the claimed invention is not found in the
prior art, a part of the nonobviousness inquiry expressly established in
Graham. 131 The suggestion test is a one-way ratchet by definition-it
must be met to find a claim obvious. But it does not act as one in at
least 43.1% of those cases where the court found the claim nonobvious or vacated a finding of obvious. The results show that the suggestion test is a big factor in nonobvious findings, but it is not an
overwhelming factor.
To put the suggestion test's impact in complete perspective,
those cases where a lack of suggestion is found can be compared to
both cases where there is another basis to support a finding of nonobvious and those cases where the court actually finds the claim obvious.
131

Graham v.John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966).
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This additional category, cases where the Federal Circuit finds the
claim obvious, is another instance where the suggestion test did not
force a finding of nonobvious. With these additional findings, twentysix affirmances of obvious findings and three reversals of nonobvious
findings, the role of the suggestion test in modern Federal Circuit
jurisprudence becomes smaller.
The suggestion test, therefore, prompted a finding of nonobvious, or vacation of a finding of obvious, for twenty-five patents
compared to fifty-four patents where the suggestion test clearly played
no role. Over the past four years, for every one patent where the suggestion test dictated the decision, two patents were not influenced by
the test. The suggestion test does not influence the final nonobviousness decision in nearly the number of cases suggested by recent
criticism.
This finding becomes even more interesting when combined with
the almost even frequency of ultimate findings of nonobvious and
obvious discussed in Part III.A.l There, the results were discounted
because litigants could have been operating under the lowered nonobviousness bar, bringing cases that assumed a lower standard would
be applied. Critics assert that this lower standard is created by the
suggestion test, but the results of the micro-level study indicate that
the suggestion test does not play as large of a role. Litigants, reading
the Federal Circuit case law over this four year period, would not
come away with the impression that the suggestion test drives the decision in most nonobviousness cases. If the suggestion test is the alleged
cause of the lowered nonobviousness requirement, the Federal Circuit's case law is not adequately sending that message to patent players. These results, therefore, call into question the discounting of the
results in Part III.A.l It possibly revives the initial inference from the
almost even split in nonobvious to obvious outcomes-that the nonobviousness requirement has not been lowered.
One final observation of interest needs to be made. This part of
the study also uncovered the miniscule role secondary considerations
play in the Federal Circuit nonobviousness jurisprudence. In only
one instance were secondary considerations by themselves the reason
for a holding, and it was only to vacate a lower court's holding of
obvious. 132 In the four other patents where secondary considerations
were used to support the court's decision, the court also relied upon a

132 See Display Techs., Inc. v. Paul Flum Ideas, Inc., 282 F.3d 1340, 1347 (Fed. Cir.
2002).
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failure to meet the suggestion test to support its conclusion. 133 These
results confirm those of Professor Mandel, who also concluded that
secondary considerations play a very insignificant role in nonobviousness jurisprudence.I3 4 This finding is of interest because it brings into
question some of the criticism of the Federal Circuit's jurisprudence
centered on secondary considerations. 135
b.

Appeals from the USPTO

The study turned up fewer relevant data points to perform the
same inquiry as done above-looking at the suggestion test's effect on
affirmances of nonobvious findings and reversals and vacations of
obvious findings by the USPTO. There were only eight such patents
that fell into these categories and in five of them failing the suggestion
test was the reason for the court's conclusion. Three of the patents
were found nonobvious or remanded on other grounds.
The lack of data is not surprising given that mainly findings of
obvious are appealed from the USPTO and the affirmance rate of
such findings by the Federal Circuit is very high. 1 36 The high affirmance of obvious findings by the USPTO indicates that the suggestion
test represents even less of an obstacle in USPTO cases. The Federal
Circuit allowed the suggestion test to be met and patents held obvious
for forty-six patents on appeal from the USPTO. Thus, in total, the
suggestion test did not force a finding of nonobvious in forty-nine
(90.74%) of the fifty-four patents appealed from the USPTO.
However, the whole story does not show up in the population
studied. As previously mentioned, there are very limited instances in
which the court will see appeals from the issuance of patents. 137 A
high number of situations could, and most likely do, exist where the
suggestion test prompted a finding of nonobvious and resulted in the
allowance of a patent application. This study, because of the parameters chosen, does not have the ability to take into account the complete usage of the suggestion test at the USPTO level.
133 See Knoll Pharm. Co. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 367 F.3d 1381, 1384-85 (Fed.
Cir. 2004); Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Cable & Wireless Internet Servs., Inc., 344 F.3d
1186, 1196-1197 (Fed. Cir. 2003); PIN/NIP, Inc. v. Platte Chern. Co., 304 F.3d 1235,
1247-48 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Neupak, Inc. v. Ideal Mfg. & Sales Corp., 41 F. App'x. 435,
439-40 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
134 See Mandel, Empirical Demonstration, supra note 28, at 1422-25.
135 See FED. TRADE CoMM'N, supra note 3, at ch. 4, at 15-19 (asserting that the
Federal Circuit's implementation of the secondary consideration of "commercial
success" improperly lowers the nonobviousness requirement).
136 See supra Part III.A.2.
137 See 35 U.S.C. § 141 (Supp. III 2003).
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This being said, the Federal Circuit's attitude toward, and usage
of, the suggestion test sets the tone for the USPTO's usage of the test.
Like district courts, the USPTO is guided by Federal Circuit case law.
The Federal Circuit, through its high affirmance rate and agreement
in most cases that the suggestion test is met, signals to the USPTO that
patent applications can be found obvious and that those findings will
be supported. The suggestion test definitely plays a role in the
USPTO's nonobviousness analysis. But, based on the results of this
study, it does not automatically result in a conclusion of nonobvious in
most cases. These findings, when combined with those in Part III.A.2
of the study, indicate that the nonobviousness requirement has not
been lowered with respect to the USPTO and that the suggestion test
may not restrict the USPTO as much as critics indicate.
2.

The Suggestion Test as a Barrier to Summary Judgment

The Federal Circuit's suggestion test is also criticized as being an
obstacle to summary judgment on nonobviousness. Attempts to
resolve issues of nonobviousness on summary judgment are thwarted
by the need to determine whether a suggestion is present or not. 138
The argument is that since the suggestion test is a factual inquiry, 139 it
will always present a genuine issue of material fact requiring a trial to
resolve. This micro-level part of the study is continued to test this
assertion.
Since this inquiry focuses on summary judgment, only appeals
from patent infringement cases are examined. 140 All 102 patents
where the issue of nonobviousness was on appeal are included, with
initial attention to how the nonobviousness issue was disposed of by
the trial court and how the Federal Circuit handled this disposition on
appeal. There were four types of dispositions observed in the population. Two were decisions as a matter of law-summary judgments and
JMOLs-and two were factual findings-bench trial verdicts and jury
verdicts. 141 The descriptive statistics are as follows:
138 See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
139 See Ruiz v. A.B. Chance Co., 234 F.3d 654, 665 (Fed. Cir. 2000). "'Determining
whether there is a suggestion or motivation to modify a prior an reference is one
aspect of determining the scope and content of the prior art, a fact question subsidiary to the ultimate conclusion of obviousness.'» !d. (quoting SIBIA Neurosciences,
Inc. v. Gadus Pharm. Corp., 225 F.3d 1349, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).
140 There is no equivalent to summary judgment in patent examination by the
USPTO. See, e.g., LAWRENCE M. SuNG & jEFF E. ScHWARTZ, PATENT LAw HANDBOOK
§ 11:1 (2005-2006 ed.).
141 Both of these latter categories-bench trials and jury verdicts-included denials by the district court of requests for judgment~ as a matter of law.
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(l) the Federal Circuit affirmed 39.02% (sixteen) of the
appealed summary judgments, while it reversed 0% (zero) of them
and vacated 60.98% (twenty-five) of them;
(2) the Federal Circuit affirmed 0% (zero) of the appealed
JMOLs, while it reversed 55.56% (five) of them and vacated 44.44%
(four) of them;
(3) the Federal Circuit affirmed 70.83% (seventeen) of the
appealed bench trial verdicts, while it reversed 12.5% (three) of them
and vacated 16.67% (four) of them; and
(4) the Federal Circuit affirmed 82.14% (twenty-three) of the
appealed jury verdicts, while it reversed 7.14% (two) of them and
vacated 10.71% (three) of them.
Looking at the descriptive statistics alone, a clear difference in
the court's handling of judgments becomes noticeable. Determinations made outside the full fact finding setting-either by summary
judgment or as aJMOL-are heavily vacated or reversed. In contrast,
the affirmance rate for judgments that result from full fact findingeither by trial before a jury or before a judge-is very high.
Statistical testing supports this casual observation. A Fisher Exact
Test results in a p-value of 0.0000086, indicating the differences are
highly statistically significant. 142 This relationship holds true when
analyzing the court's disposition of only cases where the lower court
found the patent claim nonobvious and only cases where the lower
court found the patent claim obvious.
The data for only those appeals from decisions finding the patent
nonobvious are reproduced below:

142 To increase the validity of the test, statistics were combined in a logical fashion
to create a 2x2 table. The two judgments as a matter of law-summary judgment and
]MOL-were combined as were the two factfinding based judgments-bench trial
and jury trial verdicts. Furthermore, affinnances were viewed as positive treatments of
the lower court's judgment and reversals and vacations were grouped together and
considered negative treatments of the lower court's judgment.
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Just focusing on appeals from findings of nonobvious, there is
still a significant statistical relationship between outcome and the type
of lower court judgment. A Fisher's Exact Test produces a p-value of
0.01434. The Federal Circuit is more likely to affirm a factual finding
of the lower court as opposed to a legal one, even when the finding at
issue is one of nonobvious.
A similar result is found when looking at only lower court judgments of obvious. The data from the study are reproduced below:
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A Fisher's Exact Test produces a p-value of 0.00083, indicating a
highly statistically significant relationship between the type of judgment and the Federal Circuit's affirmance or reversal or vacation of a
finding of obvious.
Another observation of import can be made from these data.
The Federal Circuit decisions evidence the same bias in favor of
bench trial and jury trial verdicts for both findings of non obvious and
obvious. Such a result is not surprising given the differing standard of
review applied to these types of judgments. A grant of summary judgment is reviewed de novo, 143 and a grant of JMOL is reviewed under
the same standard the district court applied-whether no substantial
evidence supported the jury's verdict. 144 Both of these standards give
the Federal Circuit great leeway in reversing or vacating the lower
court's judgment. Factual findings made as the result of a bench trial
are reviewed for clear error 145 and those made as a result of jury verdict are reviewed for substantial evidence. 146 These standards are
more deferential to the lower court's finding and thus restrict the
scope of the Federal Circuit's review.
143 See Augustine Med., Inc. v. Progressive Dynamics, Inc., 194 F.3d 1367, 1370
(Fed. Cir. 1999).
144 See SIBIA Neurosciences, 225 F.3d at 1354.
145 See Golden Blount, Inc. v. Robert H. Peterson Co., 365 F.3d 1054, 1058 (Fed.
Cir. 2004).
146 SeeTI Group Auto. Sys. (N. Am.), Inc. v. VDO N. Am., L.L.C., 375 F.3d 1126,
1133 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
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This result further supports an earlier conclusion in Part Ill.A.l,
that the Federal Circuit is not biased towards a finding of nonobvious
or obvious. If a bias, or a lowering of the nonobviousness requirement, did exist, then this bias would result in affirmances of such findings regardless of how, procedurally, the lower courts made them. A
bias towards one or the other would have disturbed the general relationship between type of judgment and affirmance or reversal or vacation. It did not.
But these results beg the question as to the suggestion test's
impact on these findings. Is the reason for such a high vacation of
summary judgment determinations the existence of the suggestion
test? A closer look at the cases where a summary judgment was on
appeal is taken.
Sixteen of the forty-one summary judgments on appeal were
affirmed by the Federal Circuit, eight of which were affirmances of
summary judgments of nonobvious and the other eight affirmances of
summary judgments of obvious. For these sixteen, the suggestion test
was clearly not an obstacle to summary judgment considering the summary judgments in those cases were both granted by the lower court
and allowed to stand. The question becomes how the suggestion test
operated in the other twenty-five cases where the Federal Circuit
vacated the summary judgment below.
Codings similar to those used in Part Ill.B.l are used, looking to
see if the vacation was due to a factual issue regarding the suggestion
test or some other grounds. The results are as follows:
(1) 28.0% (seven) of the twenty-five vacated summary judgments
were vacated because of factual issues related to the suggestion test;
(2) 28.0% (seven) of the twenty-five vacated summary judgments
were vacated because of factual issues related to the contents of the
prior art;
(3) 28.0% (seven) of the twenty-five vacated summary judgments
were vacated because of erroneous claim constructions; and
(4) 16.0% (four) of the twenty-five vacated summary judgments
were vacated because of some other reason.I 47
The suggestion test denied summary judgment on the issue of
nonobviousness in a little over a quarter of the Federal Circuit's vacations during the study's four-year period. Lack of a claim element in
the prior art, or an erroneous claim interpretation, played an equal
147 These other reasons, in most instances, were basic legal errors. See, e.g.,
TorPharm, Inc. v. Ranbaxy Pharms., Inc., 336 F.3d 1322, 1331-32 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(concluding that nothing in the prosecution history could overcome the statutory
mandate to assess a patent claim's nonobviousness in litigation).
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role in vacating nonobviousness determinations as the suggestion test.
The suggestion test was a factor, but no more so than other reasons
the court used to vacate summary judgments.
When looked at in the context of the complete universe of fortyone summary judgments that were appealed, the suggestion test is
seen as playing a very small role in preventing summary judgment.
The suggestion test was a barrier to summary judgment in only
17.07% of all patents subject to summary judgment in the study.
These findings do not support the assertion that the suggestion test is
a major obstacle to summary judgment on the issue of nonobviousness. It plays no more, and perhaps less, of a role than other parts of
the nonobviousness analysis or other parts of the patent litigation
process.
This micro-level study does not, however, include all summary
judgments on the issue of nonobviousness over the four-year period.
Summary judgments may have been denied at the district court level
due to the suggestion test and simply not appealed. The factual
nature of the suggestion test may also stand as an obstacle to clearer
evaluations of threats of litigation or offers to license.
But, again, the study indicates that the Federal Circuit did not
systematically use the suggestion test as a barrier to summary judgment over the four-year period. True, in some instances, such as KSR,
the suggestion test was used to vacate a summary judgment on nonobviousness. But this was one of only seven instances. These data
points, by themselves, do not define an overwhelming trend. And
they certainly do not signal one to patent players. The real barrier to
summary judgment in nonobviousness cases may be the nature of
summary judgment itself and, perhaps, the Federal Circuit's general
view toward the procedural device.
CoNCLUSION

The study provides much needed insight into the Federal Circuit's nonobviousness jurisprudence. In turn, it informs the discourse
on nonobviousness reform and the pending KSR case. Both the
macro-level and micro-level studies provide some interesting findings.
Some of those findings from the macro-level study are as follows:
(1) The almost even distribution between findings ofnonobvious
(36.27%) and obvious (28.43%) in appeals from patent infringement
cases; and
(2) The high percentage of findings of obvious (85.19%) in
appeals from the USPTO.
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Neither of these results directly addresses whether the Federal
Circuit has lowered the nonobviousness requirement. As discussed,
however, they do create at least a weak inference that the standard has
not been relaxed, particularly in the USPTO setting. If the bar had
been lowered, one would expect a higher number of nonobvious findings. Furthermore, of relevance to recent claims, these findings
clearly do not give support to recent assertions-that the bar has been
lowered.
Some of the more interesting findings from the micro-level study
are:
(1) the small role the suggestion test plays in nonobviousness
determinations, leading to a finding of nonobvious, or denying a finding of obvious, in 24.5% of the patents appealed from patent infringement cases and 9.26% of patent appealed from the USPTO; and
(2) the small role the suggestion test plays in vacations of summary judgment on nonobviousness, leading to a denial in 17.07% of
the patents appealed.
These findings have a direct bearing on the reason most believe
the nonobviousness standard has decreased-the suggestion test. The
study's results indicate that the suggestion test only forces a finding of
nonobvious in one-third of patent infringement appeals and onetenth of appeals from the USPTO. If the bar has decreased, another
factor is to blame. In addition, while the Federal Circuit does vacate a
good number of summary judgments on nonobviousness (60.98%),
the suggestion test can only account for less than one-third of those
vacations. Assertions that the existence of the suggestion test forces a
trial on nonobviousness are not supported.
All of these findings should, at the very least, give pause to recent
calls to modifY or do away with the suggestion test and the Federal
Circuit's recent nonobviousness jurisprudence. This is particularly
true when they are combined with the recent findings of Professors
Petherbridge and Wagner and Professor Mandel. 148 It does not
appear that the court is tilted one way or the other. Nor does the
suggestion test seem to be playing as large of a role in the jurisprudence as thought. This is not to say that the suggestion test and the
Federal Circuit should be ignored. Instead, the study suggests that
those wishing to reform nonobviousness should expand those parts of,
and players in, the patent process subject to investigation and possible
change.

148 Mandel, Experimental Study, supra note 28, at ll-20; Petherbridge & Wagner,
supra note 5 (manuscript at 5-20).
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